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Do Analysts Disclose Cash Flow Forecasts with Earnings 
Estimates when Earnings Quality is Low? 
 
 
PAWEL BILINSKI 
 
 
Abstract: Cash flows are incrementally useful to earnings in security valuation mainly when 
earnings quality is low. This suggests that when earnings quality decreases, analysts will be more 
likely to supplement their earnings forecasts with cash flow estimates. Contrary to this 
prediction, we find that analysts do not disclose cash flow forecasts when the quality of earnings 
is low. This is because cash flow forecast accuracy depends on the accuracy of the accrual 
estimates and the precision of accrual forecasts decreases for firms with low quality earnings. 
Consequently, as earnings quality decreases, cash flow forecasts become increasingly inaccurate 
compared to earnings estimates. Cash flow estimates that lack reliability are not useful to 
investors and, consequently, unlikely to be reported by analysts. This result provides an 
explanation for why analysts are less likely to report cash flow estimates when earnings quality is 
low.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, analysts have started supplementing their earnings forecasts with cash flow 
estimates.1 However, we know little about what determines analysts’ choice to report cash flow 
forecasts with earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates to I/B/E/S, and in particular, the effect 
earnings quality has on this decision. To date, only DeFond and Hung (2003) have examined 
analysts’ propensity to disclose cash flow forecasts via I/B/E/S.2 DeFond and Hung report that 
analysts publish cash flow forecasts when absolute total accruals are high, which they attribute to 
higher investor demand for cash flow forecasts to help interpret the information contained in 
earnings when earnings quality is low. Their results are consistent with the notion that cash flows 
are incrementally useful to earnings in security valuation mainly when earnings quality is low (Ali, 
1994; Dechow, 1994; Penman, 2009). 
While DeFond and Hung (2003) examine why analysts report cash flow forecasts from 
the demand side perspective, we consider the supply side explanation. Specifically, DeFond and 
Hung’s “demand hypothesis” ignores the fact that cash flow forecasts are useful only if they are 
of sufficient quality relative to earnings estimates. We propose that the relative accuracy of cash 
flow forecasts compared to earnings estimates depends on the accuracy of accrual estimates and 
that the precision of accrual forecasts reduces for firms with low earnings quality. As cash flow 
forecasts become increasingly inaccurate compared to earnings estimates when earnings quality is 
low, their usefulness to investors decreases, which negatively affects analysts’ propensity to 
supply cash flow estimates. Further, issuing inaccurate cash flow estimates can be damaging to 
the analyst’s reputation as investors can perceive the estimates’ low quality as a signal of low 
                                                          
1 The proportion of earnings forecasts accompanied by cash flow estimates in our sample increases from 6.1% over 
2000–2003 to 11.6% over 2006–2008. 
2 As in DeFond and Hung (2003), we focus on the analysts’ decision to disclose their earnings and cash flow 
forecasts to I/B/E/S. I/B/E/S forecasts are available to vast investor groups, including important institutional 
investors. Further, I/B/E/S forecasts are likely to be closely monitored by investors as access to I/B/E/S reduces 
information search and processing costs for investors as it provides comparable cash flow estimates from a large 
analyst pool (Ertimur et al. 2011).  
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analyst quality.3 In equilibrium, the frequency of cash flow forecast issuance will depend on both 
investor demand for this forecast and analyst ability to produce quality cash flow estimates.  
To examine the effect earnings quality has on analysts’ propensity to jointly issue cash 
flow and earnings forecasts, we use all one-year-ahead annual EPS estimates and the 
accompanying cash flow forecasts for US firms over the fiscal years 2000–2008.4 Of the 537,766 
individual analyst EPS forecasts in our sample, 9.3% are supplemented by cash flow estimates. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we study the relation between a proxy for earnings 
quality and the likelihood that an analyst will report a cash flow forecast with the earnings 
estimate. Second, we examine whether low earnings quality increases the error of analysts’ 
accrual estimates. Low accuracy of accrual estimates, and consequently of cash flow forecasts, 
when earnings quality decreases can help explain why analysts’ propensity to report cash flow 
estimates decreases when earnings quality is low.  
In examining the relation between earnings quality and the analyst propensity to jointly 
issue cash flow and earnings forecasts, we follow previous literature (e.g. Johnson et al., 2002; 
Francis et al., 2005; Elliott et al., 2010) and use the variation in discretionary current accruals 
(McNichols, 2002) as our main earnings quality measure. We find that compared to stand-alone 
EPS forecasts, the variation in current discretionary accruals is 41% lower when analysts issue 
cash flow estimates together with EPS forecasts. Multivariate logistic regressions indicate that 
analysts’ propensity to supplement EPS forecasts with cash flow estimates decreases as the 
variation in discretionary current accruals increases. This result is consistent with the prediction 
that analysts are unlikely to disclose their cash flow forecasts when earnings quality is low.   
                                                          
3 Ertimur et al. (2011) use the intuition that issuing inaccurate revenue forecasts damages the analyst’s reputation to 
examine when analysts disclose their revenue estimates with earnings forecasts.  
4 We focus on earnings quality because (1) previous studies document that cash flows are incrementally useful to 
earnings in security valuation mainly when earnings quality is low (Ali, 1994; Dechow, 1994; Penman, 2009), (2) 
DeFond and Hung (2003) argue that analysts issue more cash flow estimates when earnings quality is low, and (3) 
low earnings quality is likely to negatively affect analysts’ ability to accurately forecast accruals, thus reducing cash 
flow forecast accuracy and consequently the usefulness of cash flow estimates to investors. Low accuracy of cash 
flow forecasts when earnings quality decreases can help explain why analysts’ propensity to report cash flow 
estimates decreases for firms with low earnings quality. 
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Our conclusion that analysts are less likely to jointly report cash flow and earnings 
forecasts when earnings quality is low is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. The conclusion is 
unchanged when we consider a number of alternative proxies for earnings quality, including the 
variation in current accruals and in total accruals, the magnitude of discretionary and innate 
current accruals, and the variation in total discretionary accruals from the Jones model (Jones, 
1991). We find that our results are not attributable to the management earnings guidance, and 
annual regressions indicate that our results are not confined to specific time periods within our 
sample period. Our conclusion remains unchanged when we use the Fama–MacBeth approach 
and random sample selection as alternative controls for inflated t-statistics due to the time-series 
correlation of analyst forecasts (all our regressions use dual clustering of standard errors to 
control for cross-sectional and time-series dependence of observations, Petersen, 2009).  Finally, 
using the Cox (1972) survival model, we also document that low earnings quality increases the 
duration between cash flow forecast revisions. Together, our evidence suggests that earnings 
quality affects both the analysts’ decision to supply cash flow forecasts and the duration between 
cash flow forecast revisions. 
In further tests, we also confirm that our results are not driven by the recursive effect 
that the issuance of a cash flow forecast can have on earnings quality. Cash flow forecasts allow 
investors to disaggregate earnings into cash flow and accrual components. Disaggregation can 
increase the cost of accrual management in the presence of cash flow forecasts (McInnis and 
Collins, 2011), which can have a positive effect on earnings quality. As a result, high earnings 
quality in the presence of cash flow forecasts can reflect changes in firm reporting induced by the 
issuance of cash flow forecasts. Using instrumental variables regressions and regressions where 
we measure earnings quality before analysts start producing cash flow forecasts leave our 
inferences intact, which corroborates our main conclusions.     
As part of the robustness analysis, we address DeFond and Hung’s (2003) evidence. 
They report a positive relation between the absolute magnitude of total accruals and the 
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likelihood that the analyst will disclose the cash flow forecast with the earnings estimate. This 
result is particularly important because studies commonly rely on DeFond and Hung’s (2003) 
finding as evidence that analysts supply more cash flow forecasts when earnings quality is low.5 
Consistent with DeFond and Hung (2003), we find that analysts’ propensity to jointly issue cash 
flow and earnings forecasts has a positive association with absolute total accruals. However, 
when we use signed total accruals, signed current accruals, and the variation in total and in 
current accruals, we find results consistent with our prediction that low earnings quality reduces 
analysts’ propensity to report cash flow forecasts with earnings estimates.  
We attribute the discrepancy between our results and those of DeFond and Hung (2003) 
to their choice to use absolute total accruals as the earnings quality measure. First, the earnings 
quality measure that we use recognizes that quality of accruals and, consequently, of earnings is 
decreasing in the magnitude of accruals estimation errors, not necessarily in the magnitude of 
accruals (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Consequently, accruals estimation errors have better 
theoretical and empirical motivation as the earnings quality measure than absolute total accruals. 
Second, absolute total accruals include current and non-current accruals. Current accruals have 
lower persistence than non-current accruals, which means that (1) the magnitude and variation in 
current accruals and (2) the magnitude and variation in discretionary current accruals better 
reflect the difficulty analysts face forecasting one-year-ahead cash flows. Using earnings quality 
proxies constructed from current accruals and discretionary current accruals, we find a positive 
association between earnings quality and analysts’ propensity to jointly issue cash flow and 
earnings forecasts in all cases we investigate.  
To provide insights on why analysts do not issue cash flow forecasts when earnings 
quality is low, our second set of tests examines the relation between earnings quality and analysts’ 
accrual forecast errors. We perform these tests because cash flow forecast accuracy depends on 
                                                          
5 For example, Givoly et al. (2009, p. 1879–1880) interpret DeFond and Hung’s (2003) finding as evidence 
“consistent with the notion that analysts have provided more cash flow forecasts in recent years in response to 
demand by investors who are increasingly concerned about the inherent shortcomings of accrual accounting, such as 
its subjective nature and its susceptibility to earnings management.”. 
 6 
 
the accuracy of analyst accruals estimates.6 A negative relation between earnings quality and 
accrual forecast errors provides insights about why the accuracy of cash flow forecasts reduces 
when earnings quality is low, which can explain the negative relation between low earnings 
quality and analyst propensity to issue cash flow estimates. The mean accrual forecast error is 
1.33% of the stock price and together with the mean EPS forecast error of 1.26% explains the 
average cash flow forecast error of 2.59%. Multivariate regression analysis confirms that accrual 
forecast errors increase with the variation in current discretionary accruals, consistent with 
analysts facing a more challenging task forecasting accruals when earnings quality is low. Further, 
we find that controlling for earnings forecast accuracy, cash flow forecast errors increase for 
firms with low earnings quality. These results provide evidence consistent with the notion that 
cash flow forecasts become increasingly inaccurate compared to EPS estimates as earnings 
quality decreases, which helps explain analysts’ lower propensity to report cash flow estimates 
when earnings quality is low.   
Since cash flow forecasts are issued when accruals are relatively easy to predict, investors 
may find cash flow forecasts of little use in assessing the quality of firm earnings and in 
valuation. To test this prediction, we examine the price reaction to joint cash flow and earnings 
forecast announcements. We find no evidence that investors use cash flow estimates to interpret 
the information contained in analyst earnings forecasts. This evidence is consistent with the 
proposition that the context in which analysts issue cash flow forecasts, i.e. when earnings quality 
is high, makes them of little use in assessing the quality of firm earnings and in valuation. 
If cash flow forecasts had no economic value, we would not observe them. This study 
identifies two main factors other than earnings quality that explain why analysts disclose cash 
flow forecasts with earnings estimates. First, we find that more reputable analysts are more likely 
to issue cash flow forecasts. This suggests that more reputable analysts may use cash flow 
                                                          
6 The evidence in Givoly et al. (2009), Call et al. (2009) and Call et al. (2013a) suggests that analysts adjust their 
earnings estimate for various accruals components, such as changes in working capital, to arrive at cash flow 
forecasts. This means that the accuracy of cash flow forecasts compared to earnings estimates depends on the 
accuracy of accrual estimates. 
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forecasts to signal their quality to investors and maintain their reputation.7 Further, we find that 
analysts are more likely to issue cash flow forecasts for firms in financial distress. This finding is 
consistent with cash flow forecasts aiding investors in assessing firm’s liquidity and solvency 
when distress risk is high. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, it adds to the emerging 
literature that examines the analyst choice to issue forecasts of other accounting measures, such 
as cash flow, to complement earnings estimates. The endogeneity in the analyst choice to report 
a cash flow forecast has received limited research attention to date. The only other study in the 
area, DeFond and Hung (2003), reports conflicting evidence, which we find is due to their 
choice of the accrual measure.   
Second, the results have important implications for studies on the usefulness of cash 
flow forecasts in security valuation and on the use of cash flow forecasts as a measure of firm 
accruals. In particular, Givoly et al. (2009, p. 1877) report that “estimating expected accruals as 
the difference between analysts’ earnings forecasts and their cash flow forecasts does not result 
in a better detection of earnings management than achieved by commonly used accrual models”. 
This result is not surprising as we report evidence suggesting that analysts do not issue cash flow 
forecasts when low earnings quality may conceal earnings management. Further, this study helps 
explain the Call et al.’s (2009) results. They find that analyst earnings forecasts are more accurate 
when accompanied by cash flow estimates. Call et al. (2009) argue that analysts who produce 
cash flow forecasts adopt a more structured approach to forecasting that imposes greater 
discipline on the earnings forecasting process, which leads to higher earnings forecast accuracy. 
We find that analysts report cash flow forecasts when earnings are of high quality. This evidence 
suggests that earnings forecasts issued with cash flow estimates will be of high quality 
considering the positive relation between EPS forecast accuracy and earnings quality in 
Bradshaw et al. (2001), Hughes et al. (2008) and Bilinski and Eames (2012).  
                                                          
7 Maintaining reputation with investors is important for analyst remuneration and career outcomes (Hong and 
Kubik, 2003; Leone and Wu, 2007) 
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2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE  
Earnings are considered a better aggregate indicator of firm periodic performance than other 
accounting numbers, such as cash flow (Hopwood and McKeown, 1985; Hoskin et al., 1986; 
Dechow, 1994; Easton et al., 1992; Beyer et al., 2010). This is because accrual accounting alters 
the timing of cash flow recognition, mitigating the timing and matching problems of cash flows. 
However, accruals are based on assumptions and estimates and are subject to managerial 
discretion, which can lead to earnings manipulation. Intentional and unintentional accrual 
estimation errors lower the usefulness of earnings as a performance measure (Francis and 
Krishnan 1999; Palepu et al., 2000; Dechow and Dichev, 2002). As a result, low earnings quality 
may influence investor demand for forecasts of earnings components, such as cash flows, to 
complement earnings estimates.8 If analysts are able to accurately forecast accruals, and 
consequently cash flows, their cash flow estimates can aid investors in firm valuation and in 
assessing earnings quality. This section reviews previous evidence on the determinants of the 
analyst choice to issue cash flow forecasts.  
 
(i) Determinants of the choice to issue cash flow forecasts 
Compared to cash flows, earnings are subject to the revenue recognition principle and the 
matching principle, which make earnings a better measure of firm periodic performance. 
Consistent with this prediction, Bowen et al. (1987), Wilson (1987) and Dechow (1994) show a 
higher association between returns and earnings than between returns and cash flows over 
quarterly and annual reporting periods.  
DeFond and Hung (2003) argue that managers have lower discretion to influence cash 
flows than accruals, which makes cash flow forecasts useful in assessing the information content 
of earnings. DeFond and Hung (2003) find that the likelihood an analyst will report a cash flow 
forecast with the EPS estimate increases for firms with large absolute total accruals, controlling 
                                                          
8 This links our paper with studies that examine the usefulness of information in earnings components (Stark, 1997; 
Subramanyam and Venkatachalam, 2007; Kumar and Krishnan, 2008). 
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for firm accounting discretion, investment policy, income volatility, and poor financial health. 
However, absolute total accruals are a poor proxy for earnings quality (Hribar and Nichols, 2007; 
Dechow et al., 2010), which means that DeFond and Hung’s (2003) results are likely to be 
sensitive to their choice of the earnings quality measure.9  
Building on DeFond and Hung’s (2003) evidence, a number of studies have explored the 
market implications of analysts disclosing their cash flow forecasts. Call et al. (2009) find that 
analysts produce more accurate earnings forecasts when they are complemented by cash flow 
estimates. They argue that analysts producing cash flow forecasts adopt a more structured 
approach to forecasting that imposes a greater discipline on the earnings forecasting process, 
which explains the higher accuracy of earnings forecasts issued with cash flow estimates. Other 
studies in this area analyze the conditions when firms choose to meet either cash flow or 
earnings expectations (Brown et al., 2008), and investors’ reaction to firms beating analyst cash 
flow expectations (Zhang, 2008).  
Givoly et al. (2009) examine the sophistication of analyst cash flow forecasts and their 
accuracy relative to the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. They find that cash flow forecasts 
are less accurate, more biased and less frequently revised during the forecast period than earnings 
forecasts. Givoly et al. report that cash flow forecasts appear to be naïve extensions of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts that can be easily replicated by investors by adding back the depreciation and 
amortization expenses to analysts’ earnings forecast. Further, they document that cash flow 
forecasts provide limited information on expected changes in working capital and that estimates 
of expected accruals obtained from earnings and cash flow forecasts work equally well as other 
commonly used accrual models. Finally, they find evidence suggesting that cash flows only 
weakly associate with annual stock returns, thus do not appear to be a good surrogate for the 
unobservable market expectation of cash flows. Givoly et al. conclude that DeFond and Hung’s 
                                                          
9 We address the evidence in DeFond and Hung (2003) in detail in Section 7.  
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(2003) “demand hypothesis” may have limited use in explaining analysts’ propensity to produce 
cash flow estimates.  
Contrary to Givoly et al.’s (2009) results, Call et al. (2013a) argue that cash flow forecasts 
include meaningful and useful accrual adjustments to analyst earnings estimates. Their main tests 
rely on the analysis of 90 full-text analyst reports. They find that the majority of cash flow 
forecasts in the research reports include explicit adjustments for working capital and other 
accruals. Further, they report that tests that compare the accuracy of analyst cash flow forecasts 
with time-series cash flow estimates produce evidence supporting the superiority of the former. 
Finally, they document a significant price reaction to cash flow forecast revisions controlling for 
earnings forecast revisions. Call et al. (2013a) conclude that cash flow forecasts are useful to 
investors in the investment decision process.10  
Prior research indicates lack of consensus on the role that cash flow forecasts play in 
security valuation and in aiding investors in assessing earnings quality. We contribute to this 
literature by specifically examining if analysts produce cash flow forecasts when earnings quality 
is low. Our findings have direct implications for studies that examine cash flow forecast 
properties, such as sophistication and value-relevance, and for studies that examine the capital 
markets implications of cash flow forecast issuance, such as studies that use cash flow and 
earnings forecasts to capture investor accrual expectations or to identify firms that are more 
likely to engage in earnings management.  
  
(ii) The relation between earnings quality and analyst disclosure of cash flow forecasts with earnings estimates 
DeFond and Hung (2003) study only the demand side explanation for the issuance of analyst 
cash flow forecasts. This study also examines the supply side explanation for the joint earnings 
and cash flow forecast reporting. Specifically, we propose that the relative accuracy of cash flow 
                                                          
10 A rebuttal study by Givoly et al. (2013) argues that results in Call et al. (2013a) arise because of their use of 
inappropriate and contradictory tests. Call et al. (2013b) response to Givoly et al. (2013) highlights that differences 
in assumptions on how analysts arrive at cash flow forecasts lead to different choices of empirical tests, which 
explains the discrepancy in conclusions of Call et al. (2013a) compared to Givoly et al. (2009). 
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forecasts compared to earnings estimates depends on analysts’ ability to accurately estimate 
accruals. Forecasting accruals should be more challenging if earnings quality is low, which 
reduces the accuracy of accrual estimates.11 If cash flow forecasts become increasingly inaccurate 
compared to earnings estimates as earnings quality decreases, they become less useful to 
investors in appraising earnings quality and in firm valuation. Further, inaccurate cash flow 
estimates can damage analyst reputation. As a result, analyst propensity to disclose cash flow 
forecasts should reduce when earnings quality is low.   
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
(i) Measures of earnings quality 
We follow prior research (e.g. Johnson et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2005; Elliott et al., 2010; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2012; Ecker et al., 2010) and use the variation in discretionary current 
accruals to measure earnings quality.12 This measure captures the intuition that quality of accruals 
and, consequently, of earnings is decreasing in the magnitude of accruals estimation errors. We 
use the residuals from the McNichols (2002) extension of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
current accruals model to capture discretionary accruals.13 McNichols’s (2002) current accruals 
model takes the form:  
0 1 1 2 3 1 4 5it it it it it it itCA CFO CFO CFO REV PPE u                 (1) 
where CAit stands for current accruals for firm i in year t, defined as the change in current assets, 
less change in cash, less change in current liabilities plus the change in debt in current liabilities.  
CFO is cash flow from operations. The first four components of model (1) form the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model. McNichols’ (2002) extension of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model includes in the current accruals model the gross value of property plant and equipment, 
                                                          
11 To illustrate, low earnings quality means that past financial statements are less helpful in forecasting accruals, 
increasing the difficulty analysts face to accurately estimate current period accruals.  
12 For an in-depth discussion of earnings quality measures, we refer the reader to a number of comprehensive review 
papers including Dechow et al. (2010), Francis et al. (2006), Lo (2008), Dechow and Schrand (2004), Imhoff (2003), 
Penman (2003), Nelson et al. (2003), Schipper and Vincent (2003). 
13 The predicted values from the accrual model capture non-discretionary (normal) accruals originating from 
company operations. 
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PPE, and changes in firm sales, ΔREV. Including PPE and ΔREV decreases the measurement 
error and improves the model’s explanatory power (McNichols, 2002; Francis et al., 2005). All 
variables are scaled by average total assets for the current and the previous fiscal year.  
The model residuals, uit, measure discretionary current accruals. The current period 
earnings quality is the standard deviation of the model’s residuals for years t−3 to t, 
M_CAQ=STD(uit). Large variation in discretionary accruals means poor mapping of accruals 
into cash flows, indicating high accruals estimation errors. High accruals estimation errors 
suggest low current accruals quality and consequently low earnings quality. M_CAQ is our main 
proxy for earnings quality. We estimate model (1) annually for each 2-digit SIC industry with a 
minimum of 20 firms.  
 
(ii) Predicting the analyst decision to jointly report cash flow and earnings forecasts 
We use a multivariate logit model to explain the analyst choice to jointly report cash flow and 
earnings estimates and the basic model setup is:   0   ijt itPr DCF Demand factors Supply factors e        (2) 
where ijtDCF is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if an earnings forecast by analyst j 
for firm i issued at time t is supplemented by a cash flow forecast, and is zero otherwise. Demand 
factors is a vector of characteristics predicting investor demand for analyst cash flow forecasts and 
Supply factors is a vector of characteristics predicting analyst supply of cash flow forecasts. eit is the 
error term. Earnings quality is likely to affect both investor demand for cash flow forecasts and 
analyst supply of cash flow forecasts, which means that model (2) extends to:   
 
'
0
'
0
' '
[ _  ]
[ _  ]
_
  
ijt
it
it
Pr DCF M CAQ Other demand factors
M CAQ Other supply factors u
M CAQ
Other demand factors Other supply factors e
   
        
      (3) 
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where Other demand factors and Other supply factors are vectors Demand factors and Supply factors less 
the earnings quality measure M_CAQ. The demand hypothesis in DeFond and Hung (2003) 
suggests a positive φ coefficient and the supply hypothesis suggests a negative π. Grouping 
coefficients φ and π together indicates that the coefficient on M_CAQ in a regression explaining 
the analyst decision to disclose the cash flow forecast captures the net effect of the demand and 
the supply considerations. Specifically, a positive coefficient on M_CAQ suggests that investor 
demand pressure outweighs analyst reluctance to disclose low quality cash flow estimates. A 
negative coefficient means that analysts do not respond to investor demand and refrain from 
disclosing low quality cash flow estimates when earnings quality is low.14  
The other explanatory variables than the earnings quality measure in model (3) include 
analyst and broker characteristics associated with analyst forecasting skill and reputation, and 
firm characteristics that could affect the forecasting difficulty and investor demand for cash flow 
forecasts. We detail these variables below.  
 
(iii) Analyst and broker characteristics 
We use the analyst’s general forecasting experience (G_experience) to capture the forecasting 
knowledge and skill an analyst has gained over time (Clement 1999). Clement (1999) argues that 
analyst forecasting skill and ability to analyze and interpret financial statements improve as 
analysts gain experience. We expect joint issuance of cash flow and earnings forecasts to be more 
common among more experienced analysts who should be better able to produce quality cash 
flow estimates. Further, we control for the number of firms an analyst follows (Analyst workload). 
Actively following and producing research reports on more companies is likely to discourage an 
                                                          
14 Our framework is similar to other studies that examine equilibrium supply of management or analyst forecasts. To 
illustrate, Lansford et al. (2013) examine demand and supply factors that predict managerial revenue guidance. They 
argue that firm decision to issue revenue guidance is positively affected by investor demand for revenue guidance 
(the demand explanation for revenue guidance) and negatively affected by the low precision of revenue forecasts 
(the supply explanation for revenue guidance). Lansford et al. (2013) acknowledge that certain factors, such as 
difficulties in forecasting revenue, affect both supply and demand for revenue forecasts.  
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analyst from devoting the time necessary to produce and report complementary cash flow 
forecasts. 
More reputable analysts may use cash flow estimates to signal their higher quality and 
maintain reputation with investors. Maintaining reputation is important for analysts as reputation 
directly affects analyst remuneration and career outcomes (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Leone and 
Wu, 2007). We measure analyst reputation by the analyst inclusion on the All-America Research 
Team compiled by the Institutional Investor magazine. Specifically, we define a new indicator 
variable, Star analyst, that equals one for analysts classified as members of the All-America 
Research Team by the Institutional Investor magazine in the most recent annual ranking. We use 
the Institutional Investor magazine ranking from the October issue of year t to identify forecasts 
issued by star analysts over the next 12-months.15   
The number of analysts employed by a broker (Broker size) reflects broker quality and 
resources available to analysts. Access to a large resource pool at the broker should help analysts 
in forecasting cash flows. This access, in return, should positively affect analyst propensity to 
issue cash flow estimates with earnings forecasts. Further, availability of resources may entice 
large brokers to introduce policies where analysts are required to disclose their cash flow 
estimates.  
 
(iv) Firm characteristics 
We control for the firm’s cash flow volatility (CF_STD) as higher cash flow volatility increases 
the difficulty analysts face when forecasting cash flows, which can reduce their propensity to 
report cash flow estimates. However, high uncertainty about cash flow can also increase investor 
demand for analyst cash flow forecasts. Firm market capitalization (MV) and the number of 
                                                          
15 To cross-reference analyst names from I/B/E/S with the Institutional Investor magazine rankings, we require the 
I/B/E/S translation file, which is only available for the 2005 I/B/E/S edition. Using the 2005 I/B/E/S translation 
file could potentially misclassify top ranked analysts that started reporting on I/B/E/S after 2005. We inspected the 
matching process, but found no evidence that the matching between the Institutional Investor magazine rankings 
and I/B/E/S is any worse after 2005. More recent versions of the I/B/E/S translation file are unavailable as 
Thomson-Reuters suspended access to the translation file for academic research.  
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analysts following a company (Analyst following) proxy for the quality of the firm’s information 
environment. A richer information environment should reduce the cost of producing cash flow 
forecasts, increasing the likelihood an analyst will report the cash flow forecast with the earnings 
estimate. However, richer information environment may also reduce investor demand for cash 
flow forecasts if other information sources allow investors to better interpret the information 
contained in earnings than analyst cash flow estimates.  
We control for the book-to-market (B/M) ratio as cash flow forecasts may be more 
valuable in assessing earnings quality and value of high growth firms. Analysts may find 
forecasting cash flows more difficult for younger firms with shorter time-series of financial 
information, which is likely to reduce the analysts’ propensity to jointly report cash flow and 
earnings forecasts. However, investor demand for cash flow forecasts may be higher for younger 
firms. We measure firm age (Age) as the number of years between the end-date of the previous 
fiscal year and the first time the firm is included in CRSP files.  
We control for loss-making firms (Dloss) as analyst cash flow forecasts may be more 
helpful in assessing performance of loss-making companies where earnings may not be reflective 
of firm value (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Collins et al., 1997). We employ the Altman Z-
score (Altman Z) to measure the firm’s financial health. Investors may rely more on cash flow 
forecasts to examine a firm’s ability to meet its financial obligations when distress risk is high, 
which can incentivize analysts to issue more cash flow estimates. We include an indicator 
variable for the recent financial-crisis period (Fin_crisis) as cash flow forecasts may have been 
more valuable to investors in assessing firm performance during this period. A set of year 
dummies (Year dummies) and industry dummies (Industry dummies) based on 2-digit I/B/E/S SIG 
codes control for year- and industry-effects. Year dummies are for the EPS forecast issue year. 
Analyst and broker characteristics and Analyst following are measured at the EPS forecast issue. 
Firm size, book-to-market ratio, age, loss-indicator, and Altman Z-score are measured at the end 
of the previous fiscal year. The empirical specification of our predictive model is: 
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   (4) 
Our variable of interest is the proxy for firm earnings quality, M_CAQ. If supply considerations 
have a stronger bearing on the analyst decision to disclose the cash flow estimate, we expect to 
find a negative correlation between low earnings quality and the analyst decision to disclose the 
cash flow forecast with the earnings estimate, i.e. 1 0  . If investor demand for cash flow 
forecasts outweighs analyst reluctance to disclose the cash flow estimate, the coefficient on 
M_CAQ will be positive, i.e. 1 0  , consistent with the conclusions in DeFond and Hung 
(2003). ln indicates a logarithmic transformation of a variable. Regression standard errors are 
dual-clustered on analyst and fiscal year to control for the cross-sectional and time-series 
dependence of observations (Petersen, 2009). Table 1 provides detailed definitions of the 
variables used in the study.  
 
(v) The relation between the accrual forecast error and earnings quality 
In a basic form, a cash flow forecast (CF) reflects accrual adjustments (Accruals) to the earnings 
estimate, CF=EPS+Accruals, where all components are expressed on a per-share basis. If the 
accuracy of analyst accrual estimates reduces when earnings quality is low, cash flow forecasts 
become increasingly inaccurate compared to earnings estimates, which lowers the usefulness of 
cash flow estimates to investors. Low quality of cash flow forecasts can explain why analysts do 
not produce cash flow forecasts when earnings quality is low.  
To examine whether the accuracy of accrual forecasts reduces as earnings quality 
deteriorates, we require a measure of analysts’ accrual estimates. The absolute difference between 
the actual and forecasted cash flow measures the cash flow forecast error, (|CF_FE|), which 
decomposes into the absolute earnings forecast error (|EPS_FE|) and the absolute accrual 
 17 
 
forecast error (|Accruals_FE|). The accrual forecast error is then the difference between the 
earnings and the cash flow forecast errors.  
To examine the relation between the accrual forecast error and earnings quality, we 
estimate the following regression model: 
0 1| _ | _Accruals FE M CAQ controls        (5) 
where the last component is a vector of control variables. If analysts do not have the skill to 
accurately forecast accruals when earnings quality is low, coefficient 1 will be significant and 
positive.  
For completeness, we also examine the relation between the cash flow forecast error and 
earnings quality when we control for the accuracy of analyst’s EPS estimates:   
0 1 2| _ | _ | _ | .CF FE M CAQ EPS FE controls         (6) 
Regression model (6) examines if the accuracy of cash flow forecasts reduces when earnings 
quality is low without making assumptions on how analysts arrive at cash flow forecasts, i.e. 
whether analysts use the direct or the indirect method to forecast cash flows. 
The controls in models (5) and (6) include analyst and broker characteristics, and firm 
characteristics from the logit model predicting the analyst decision to jointly report cash flow and 
earnings forecasts. I include these controls because these variables relate to the analyst 
forecasting skill and the difficulty of the forecasting task, which should explain both accrual and 
cash flow forecast errors.16  
 
4. DATA AND SAMPLE 
We include all one-year-ahead annual EPS and cash flow forecasts, together with their actual 
values, from I/B/E/S detail files for US ordinary common stocks. To be included in the sample, 
                                                          
16 To illustrate, access to a large resource pool at the broker lowers the cost of producing a cash flow forecast, which 
should positively affect the likelihood an analyst will include the cash flow forecast with the earnings estimate. 
However, lower information acquisition and processing costs should also positively affect the accuracy of analyst 
accrual and cash flow estimates.  
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the cash flow forecast must be issued within a five-day window around the EPS forecast issue 
date. Financial statement information is from the CRSP/Compustat merged database and stock 
return information is from CRSP. All variables are winsorized at 1%. The final sample includes 
537,766 EPS forecasts and 49,820 cash flow estimates issued during 2000–2008.17 
 
(i) Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution of EPS and cash flow forecasts across fiscal years in 
our sample. The total number of EPS forecasts increases by two-thirds, from 43,984 in 2000 to 
68,687 in 2008. The proportion of cash flow forecasts accompanying earnings estimates 
increases from 6.1% over 2000–2003 to 11.6% over 2006–2008.18 Overall, the results in Table 2 
are consistent with previous evidence (DeFond and Hung, 2003 and Givoly et al., 2009) that the 
number of cash flow forecasts accompanying earnings estimates has increased over time.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the distribution of stand-alone EPS forecasts and of EPS 
forecasts supplemented by cash flow estimates across 11 industries based on the 2-digit I/B/E/S 
SIG code. For each industry, we also report the proportion of analysts issuing at least one cash 
flow forecast for a firm in a year. Cash flow forecasts dominate in the energy sector (coal and oil 
extraction and refining, gas and energy production and transportation), with 41.2% of all 
earnings estimates issued together with cash flow forecasts. The energy sector also has the largest 
proportion of analysts issuing at least one cash flow forecast for a firm in a year.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in the 
logit model (4) and in the accuracy models (5) and (6). In our sample, 9.26% of all EPS forecasts 
are issued together with a cash flow estimate. The mean accrual forecast error is 1.32% of the 
                                                          
17 For comparison, DeFond and Hung (2003) examine 1,623 cash flow forecasts over 1993–1999 and Givoly et al. 
(2009) use 7,543 cash flow forecasts over 1993–2005. Call et al. (2013a) select analysts’ last cash flow forecasts 
issued before the earnings announcement, which generates a sample of 29,833 cash flow estimates over 1993–2008. 
18 DeYoung et al. (2009) report that 2006 was the peak of a consolidation wave among brokerage firms that started 
in 2003, with mergers and acquisitions in the industry totalling $100 billion compared to less than $25 billion in 
2003. Post-consolidation changes may have a stronger effect on the analysts’ discretionary decision to issue cash 
flow forecasts compared to the issuance of earnings forecasts, which are the main forecasts produced by analysts. 
This can explains the slight reduction in the proportion of analysts cash flow forecasts issued in 2006.  
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stock price and the cash flow forecast error is 2.59%. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics 
for the EPS forecast error and for the earnings quality measure. The pooled sample mean EPS 
forecast error is 1.33% and reduces to 1.26% when a cash flow forecast complements the EPS 
estimate.19 The average cash flow forecast error is significantly higher than the mean EPS 
forecast error (results untabulated), consistent with the evidence in Givoly et al. (2009). The 
mean variation in discretionary current accruals is 8.12%. 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics for analyst and broker characteristics. Star analysts 
have issued around 0.4% of the sample earnings forecasts and an average analyst has been 
present in the sample for over six years.20 An average analyst follows over 13 companies and the 
mean number of analysts employed by a broker is over 56. Panel D presents the descriptive 
statistics for the firm-related explanatory variables. The mean cash flow volatility is 1.222, 
average firm market capitalization is over $3.8b and an average firm is followed by over 10 
analysts. The mean B/M ratio is 0.497 and an average firm has been present in our sample for 
close to 21 years. Close to 18% of companies reported a loss in the previous fiscal year and 
average Altman Z-score is 5.041. Over 11% of earnings forecasts in our sample were issued 
during the recent financial crisis.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
(i) The analyst’s decision to issue a cash flow forecast with the earnings estimate 
To examine the determinants of the analyst choice to issue cash flow forecasts to accompany 
EPS estimates, we start with non-parametric portfolio analysis, which is followed by multivariate 
regression analysis. 
 
                                                          
19 In unreported results we find that the mean EPS forecast error for the pooled sample is significantly higher than 
the mean EPS forecast error for EPS estimates issued with cash flow forecasts. This is consistent with the evidence 
in Call et al. (2009), who find lower EPS forecast error in the presence of cash flow estimates.  
20 We measure analyst forecasting experience using I/B/E/S detail files on EPS forecasts starting in 1995. This 
ensures sufficient variation in the analyst experience variable compared to measuring analyst experience starting in 
the first year of the sample period (Clement, 1999). 
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(ii) Non-parametric portfolio analysis 
As a simple test of the relation between earnings quality and analyst propensity to disclose cash 
flow forecasts, Figure 1 plots the frequency of joint issuance of EPS and cash flow forecasts for 
deciles formed on the variation in discretionary current accruals M_CAQ.  The proportion of 
cash flow forecasts that accompany earnings estimates increases from 2.3% to 17.4% when 
moving from the decile of the lowest earnings quality (Low Earn. Q) to the decile of highest 
earnings quality (High Earn. Q). In unreported results, we find that the difference in the 
frequency of cash flow estimates between the two extreme portfolios sorted on M_CAQ is 
significant at the 1% level. Figure 1 provides preliminary evidence that analysts are more likely to 
provide cash flow forecasts with EPS estimates when earnings quality is low.    
 Building on Figure 1, we compute the mean M_CAQ for stand-alone EPS forecasts and 
for joint issuance of EPS and cash flow forecasts (results untabulated). M_CAQ is 41% lower 
when analysts report both earnings and cash flow forecasts than when analysts disclose only 
earnings estimates. This evidence is consistent with our prediction that analysts may find 
forecasting accruals more challenging when earnings quality is low, which reduces their 
propensity to report cash flow estimates. 
 
(iii) Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 reports results from the logistic model (4) that predicts the analyst choice to disclose the 
cash flow estimate with the earnings forecast. Low quality accruals reduce the likelihood an 
analyst will report a cash flow forecast. A one standard deviation increase in M_CAQ lowers the 
analyst propensity to report a cash flow forecast by 19.3%. This evidence is consistent with the 
proposition that poor earnings quality reduces analyst propensity to report cash flow forecasts 
together with earnings estimates. The regression’s pseudo R2 is 28.07%, which suggests the 
model has good predictive power.   
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 Looking at the control variables, we find that All-America Research Team analysts and 
analysts employed by large brokers are more likely to produce cash flow forecasts. The former 
result suggests that reputable analysts may disclose cash flow estimates to maintain their standing 
with investors. The later result likely reflects that access to a large resource pool at the broker 
lowers the cost of producing cash flow forecasts, which has a positive effect on the analyst 
propensity to jointly issue cash flow and earnings estimates. Larger brokers may also insist that 
analysts disclose their cash flow forecasts to investors.  
 High return volatility reduces the likelihood an analyst will report the cash flow estimate. 
Further, high competition among analysts, as proxied by Analyst following, entices analysts to 
complement their EPS estimates with cash flow forecasts, which suggests that analysts may 
report cash flow forecasts to distinguish themselves from other analysts. Cash flow forecasts are 
less common for high B/M firms and for more mature firms. This evidence is consistent with 
cash flow estimates being more useful in assessing the performance of growth stocks and 
younger firms with a short history of financial performance. Analysts are less likely to report cash 
flow forecasts for loss making firms. Cash flow forecasts are more common among distressed 
firms, which reflects that cash flow forecasts are useful in assessing firm solvency and liquidity 
when distress risk is high.21 As energy firms tend to carry high debt levels, higher incidence of 
cash flow forecasts among firms with low Altman Z-scores helps explain Table 2 results that the 
energy sector exhibits a high proportion of joint issuance of cash flow and earnings forecasts.22 
                                                          
21 The evidence that controlling for earnings quality, the coefficient on Altman Z-score is negative suggests that 
among two firms with similar earnings quality, analysts will be more likely to produce cash flow forecasts for the 
firm in financial distress. This is because cash flow forecasts aid investors in assessing firm’s liquidity and solvency 
when distress risk is high. This result is consistent with the findings in Charitou et al (2011), who document a non-
monotonic relation between earnings quality and financial distress. Specifically, Charitou et al. (2011) argue that 
distressed firms may be subject to higher market scrutiny, which can have a positive effect on earnings quality by 
reducing firm’s ability to manage earnings. As the accuracy of cash flow forecasts is likely to be higher for firms with 
high earnings quality, their usefulness in assessing solvency and liquidity should increase for firms with high earnings 
quality.  
22 The review of the key performance measures for the energy sector by Michael Filloon also concludes that high 
distress risk explains why cash flow forecasts are the key performance metric in this sector 
(http://www.investopedia.com/university/important-ratios-for-analyzing-oil-and-gas-stocks/measuring-
performance.asp, accessed 16.07.2013). 
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Overall, the results in Table 4 support the prediction that uncertainty about accrual quality 
reduces analyst propensity to issue cash flow forecasts to complement EPS estimates.23  
 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
(i)  Current accruals volatility 
Table 5 presents the results of sensitivity analysis. The “Current accruals volatility” columns report 
results when we use the variation in current accruals measured over the previous four years, 
C_ACC_STD, as the earnings quality measure. This measure captures the quality of both normal 
(non-discretionary) and discretionary current accruals. Analysts may find forecasting both accrual 
components difficult, which is likely to negatively affect their propensity to report cash flow 
forecasts. Further, C_ACC_STD is not subject to the estimation error inherent in M_CAQ. The 
estimation error in discretionary accruals can reduce the power of discretionary accruals to 
capture earnings quality (Richardson et al., 2005). We find that high variation in current accruals 
predicts a lower likelihood of the analyst reporting a cash flow forecast to complement the EPS 
estimate, which corroborates our earlier results.  
 
(ii) Discretionary accruals from the Jones model  
The “Jones model” columns present results from model (4) when we use the Jones model (Jones, 
1991) to estimate discretionary accruals. The model takes the form:  
0 1 2
1       it it it it
it
TA REV PPE
Assets
    (7) 
where TAit are total accruals scaled by average of current and previous year assets, itAssets , and 
the remaining variables are similar as in equation (1). Using the variation in the Jones model 
                                                          
23 In unreported results, we repeat Table 4 results for a sample of cash flow forecasts issued over the period 1993–
1999, which is the sample period in DeFond and Hung (2003). We continue to find a negative coefficient on 
M_CAQ, consistent with our conclusion that analysts do not disclose cash flow forecasts when the quality of 
earnings is low. This conclusion is unchanged when we repeat Table 4 results for the sample period 1993–2008. 
These results are available upon request.  
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residuals, J_CAQ, as the earnings quality measure, we continue to find lower propensity of 
analysts to disclose cash flow forecasts when earnings quality is low.  
 
(iii) Magnitude of discretionary and non-discretionary current accruals 
The “Magnitude of current accruals” column of Table 5 report results when we substitute the signed 
magnitude of discretionary and non-discretionary current accruals, MD_ACC and nMD_ACC, 
for M_CAQ in regression model (4). We use MD_ACC because previous studies employ both 
the variation and the level in discretionary accruals as proxies for earnings quality (Dechow et al., 
2010; Bilinski and Eames, 2012). We control for innate accruals as this accrual component may 
be also impacting the analyst decision to supply cash flow estimates. Discretionary and non-
discretionary accruals for the previous fiscal year are estimated from the McNichols (2002) 
model.24 Analyst propensity to report cash flow forecasts alongside earnings estimates reduces 
with the magnitude of discretionary and innate current accruals. This evidence reinforces our 
previous results that poor earnings quality reduces the likelihood of analysts jointly issuing cash 
flow and earnings forecasts.  
 
(iv) Management guidance 
Management guidance can mitigate the negative effect that low earnings quality has on analysts’ 
ability to accurately forecast cash flows, which can eliminate the negative association between 
low earnings quality and analyst propensity to report cash flow forecasts. To test this prediction, 
we include a management guidance dummy (Guidance) equal to one if the firm issues earnings 
guidance in the 14-day period preceding the issuance of the analyst’s earnings forecast and the 
guidance is for the same fiscal period, otherwise Guidance is zero.25 The “Management guidance” 
                                                          
24 The residuals from McNichols (2002) model measure discretionary current accruals and the predicted values 
measure non-discretionary (innate) current accruals. 
25 We use a 14-day window between management earnings guidance and the analyst earnings forecast issue date 
because guidance should have a stronger effect on the analyst decision to jointly issue earnings and cash flow 
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column in Table 5 reports results for regression model (4) after including the Guidance indicator 
variable. The coefficient on Guidance is positive, consistent with management guidance reducing 
forecasting uncertainty and increasing analyst propensity to report cash flow estimates. However, 
controlling for earnings guidance, we still find a negative coefficient on M_CAQ. This evidence 
suggests that management guidance cannot fully mitigate the negative effect that low earnings 
quality has on the analyst propensity to jointly report cash flow and earnings estimates.  
 
(v) Other controls from DeFond and Hung (2003) 
Next we test if our results remain unchanged when, in addition to management guidance, we 
include in model (4) three of DeFond and Hung’s (2003) control variables. Specifically, we 
include accounting choice heterogeneity index, Acc_Het_Ind, because heterogeneity in accounting 
choices of a firm compared to the industry peers can reduce earnings comparability, increasing 
investor demand for cash flow estimates.26 We include earnings volatility measured over the 
previous four fiscal years, EPS_STD, as highly volatile earnings may be perceived by investors to 
be of low quality. Finally, we control for the firm’s capital intensity, Capital intensity, as capital 
intensive firms may have a higher need for the firm’s cash flow. Capital intensity is the ratio of 
gross property, plant and equipment divided by sales revenue in the fiscal year prior to the year 
for which the analyst forecasts cash flows. The results in the “DH (2003) controls” column in 
Table 5 indicate that after including the three additional controls, the coefficient on M_CAQ 
remains negative and highly significant, which corroborates our main results. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
forecasts shortly after the guidance release. Consequently, a two-week window should have more power to isolate 
the effect of management guidance on the analyst cash flow forecast reporting decision than longer windows. 
26 We follow DeFond and Hung (2003) and compute the index by assigning a value of one to each firm whose 
accounting choice differs from the most frequently chosen method in that firm’s industry group. The index is 
calculated based on five accounting choices: (1) inventory valuation, (2) investment tax credit, (3) depreciation, (4) 
successful-efforts vs. full-cost for companies with extraction activities, and (5) purchase vs. pooling. If a firm has no 
information or a missing value for a given accounting choice, the choice is coded as zero (this assumes the firm 
selects the most common accounting choice in its industry). We sum the scores for the five accounting choices for 
each firm and then divide the sum by the number of accounting choices in the industry: 5 for firms in the petroleum 
and natural gas industry, 3 for firms in banking, insurance, real estate, and trading industries, and 4 for firms in all 
other industries. 
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(vi) Annual and Fama–MacBeth regressions 
DeFond and Hung (2003) use annual and Fama–MacBeth regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 
1973) to control for inflated t-statistics due to the time-series dependence of observations. To 
test if our conclusions are sensitive to the choice of a research method to control for time-series 
dependence of observations, Table 6 replicates the analysis from Table 4 for each fiscal year over 
the sample period. 
We find that coefficients on M_CAQ are negative and significant in predicting cash flow 
forecast issuance for all annual regressions but 2004. This evidence suggests the conclusions 
from Table 4 are not confined to a specific subperiod. This result provides further confirmatory 
evidence for the main results. Further, Table 6 evidence on a significant relation between 
earnings quality and analyst propensity to issue cash flow estimates across most fiscal years 
means that results in Table 4 are unlikely to be driven by better ability of I/B/E/S to collect 
cash flow forecast data over time.  
The last column of Table 6 presents Fama–MacBeth coefficients based on the annual 
regressions and the corresponding (time-series) adjusted p-values. High variation in discretionary 
current accruals reduces analyst propensity to issue cash flow estimates consistent with our 
earlier evidence.27 
  
(vii) The recursive effect that a cash flow forecast issuance has on earnings quality 
McInnis and Collins (2011) find that accrual quality improves after analysts start producing cash 
flow forecasts for a firm. They attribute this effect to higher transparency of accruals and, 
consequently, higher cost of accrual manipulations in the presence of cash flow forecasts, which 
reduces managers’ propensity to manipulate accruals. Improved earnings quality in response to 
cash flow forecast issuance can explain Table 4 result on the positive association between 
earnings quality and analyst propensity to report cash flow estimates.  
                                                          
27 Our main results in Table 4 are based on dual-clustered standard errors as the method is superior to Fama-
MacBeth approach because the latter adjusts only for correlated errors across years. 
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 To verify whether the results are influenced by the recursive effect a complementary cash 
flow forecast issuance may have on earnings quality, we perform two tests. First, we use an 
instrumental variables regression to estimate model (4). We use earnings quality measured two 
years before the cash flow forecast issuance as the instrument. Past earnings quality is unaffected 
by the current-period changes in earnings quality induced by recent cash flow forecast issuance.28 
Second, we estimate model (4) using M_CAQ measured before analysts initiate issues of cash 
flow forecasts for a firm. In this case, the earnings quality measure cannot be impacted by the 
improvement in earnings quality motivated by the release of a cash flow forecast. 
In unreported results we find that the instrumental variables regression continues to 
show that analysts are less likely to disclose cash flow estimates with earnings forecasts for firms 
with low earnings quality. Further, the coefficient on M_CAQ measured before the first cash 
flow forecast for a firm has been issued is negative, consistent with low earnings quality reducing 
analyst propensity to report cash flow forecasts. Together, the results from the two tests support 
our main conclusions. 
In unreported results we perform four further sensitivity tests. First, to offer an 
alternative test of the sensitivity of our results to cross-sectional correlation of observations, we 
randomly choose a single forecast for each analyst-firm pair and re-estimate model (4) for this 
sample. Using only a single forecast for each analyst-firm pair in a year, the sample size falls to 
137,382 analyst–firm observations for the nine fiscal years. Replicating the analysis in Table 4 for 
this subsample, the association between our earnings quality measure and the likelihood an 
analyst will jointly issue cash flow and earnings forecasts remains unchanged.  
Second, we repeat model (4) after including indicator variables for each analyst. 
Controlling for unobserved analyst heterogeneity using analyst fixed effects, we continue to find 
a positive association between earnings quality and analyst propensity to report cash flow 
                                                          
28 If analysts initiated cash flow reporting for a firm longer than two years ago, our instrument may be weakly 
endogenous. However, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) argue that using weakly endogenous variables as instruments 
can improve estimation efficiency. 
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forecasts. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, analysts who only issue cash flow forecasts or only 
issue earnings forecasts are excluded. Further, controlling for broker fixed effects also leaves our 
conclusions intact.  
Third, we test if analysts issue cash flow forecasts to convey a more favourable signal 
about the firm prospects than their earnings forecasts would allow. The proportion of positive 
cash flow forecast revisions is 39.6%, which is close to the proportion of positive earnings 
forecast revision, which is 41.9% This suggests that it is unlikely that analysts use cash flow 
forecasts rather than earnings estimates to signal better firm prospects. 
Fourth, we repeat the analysis from Table 4 after excluding the energy sector from the 
sample. Low accrual quality continues to exhibit the negative association with the analyst 
decision to report cash flow forecasts, which suggests that including the energy industry in the 
sample does not have unduly effect on the study’s conclusions.  
    
(viii) The duration between cash flow forecast revisions 
Our tests so far show that low earnings quality reduces analyst propensity to report cash flow 
estimates with earnings forecasts. However, low earnings quality may also affect the duration 
between cash flow forecast revisions. Specifically, when earnings quality is low, analysts may 
require more time to produce a cash flow forecast of sufficient quality to disclose to investors. 
To test the prediction that low earnings quality increases the duration between cash flow 
forecasts revisions, we estimate the non-parametric proportional Cox (1972) model, which has 
the form: 
0
( : ) ( )exp( )     
jj j
Xh t X h t           (8) 
where t is the duration between cash flow forecast issuance, X is a vector of explanatory 
variables from model (4), and hj(t: X) is the hazard rate conditional on the explanatory set X.
29 
                                                          
29 Cash flow forecasts used to calculate revisions are for the same fiscal year. This criterion ensures that cash flow 
forecast revisions reflect only new information for a fiscal year.  
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hj0(t) is the baseline hazard.
30 βj are the coefficients. A positive coefficient indicates that an 
increase in the explanatory variable shortens the time between cash flow forecast revisions. A 
negative coefficient signals an increase in duration between cash flow forecast revisions for a unit 
increase in X.  
Table 7 reports results from the Cox model. The coefficient on M_CAQ is negative, 
which means that lower earnings quality increases the duration between cash flow forecasts 
revisions. Together, the evidence from Tables 7 and 4 show that low earnings quality affects 
both the analyst decisions to supply cash flow forecasts and the duration between cash flow 
forecast revisions.  
 
7. THE EVIDENCE ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE CASH FLOW ISSUANCE 
DECISION AND ABSOLUTE TOTAL ACCRUALS IN DEFOND AND HUNG (2003) 
DeFond and Hung (2003) report a positive association between the magnitude of absolute total 
accruals and the likelihood an analyst will report a cash flow forecast with the earnings estimate. 
Givoly et al. (2009, p. 1878) interpret this result as evidence that “[cash flow] forecasts are 
demanded by investors and supplied by analysts in cases where earnings are likely to be of low 
quality”. This stands in contrast to our evidence that analysts are less likely to issue cash flow 
forecasts when earnings quality is low.  
To address this discrepancy in findings, we replicate the analysis from Table 4 using (a) 
the absolute value of total accruals (|T_ACC|) as in DeFond and Hung (2003), (b) the 
magnitude of signed total accruals (T_ACC), (c) the variation in total accruals (T_ACC _STD), 
and (d) the signed value of current accruals (C_ACC).  
The “Absolute total accruals, DH (2003)” columns in Table 8 present regression results 
from model (4) when we use absolute total accruals. Consistent with DeFond and Hung (2003), 
analyst propensity to jointly issue cash flow and earnings forecasts increases with the magnitude 
                                                          
30 The intercept in Cox (1972) model is subsumed into the baseline hazard hj0(t). 
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of absolute total accruals. However, when we use signed total accruals, the variation in total 
accruals, and when we use absolute and signed current accruals, we find results consistent with 
our earlier finding that low earnings quality reduces the analyst propensity to report cash flows 
forecast with earnings estimates.31   
What can explain the discrepancy between our results and those in DeFond and Hung 
(2003)? First, the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model that is the basis for our earnings quality 
measure recognizes that quality of accruals and consequently of earnings is decreasing in the 
magnitude of accruals estimation errors, not necessarily in the magnitude of accruals.32 This 
means that our measure has better theoretical and empirical motivations than absolute 
magnitude of accruals.  
Second, absolute total accruals include current and non-current accruals. Non-current 
accruals include managerial decisions related to asset useful lives and pension liabilities, which 
have long-lasting and more predictable effects on firm accruals and cash flows. This means that 
the magnitude and variation in current accruals should better reflect the difficulty analysts face 
forecasting end-of-year accruals and cash flows. Using earnings quality proxies from current 
accruals, we find a positive association between analyst propensity to produce cash flow 
forecasts and earnings quality in all cases we investigate.  
This section shows that DeFond and Hung’s (2003) result that absolute total accruals 
predict the issuance of a cash flow forecast is likely due to their choice of the earnings quality 
measure. Our evidence complements Givoly et al.’s (2009) results. They find only weak support 
                                                          
31 The sampling procedure in DeFond and Hung (2003) is unclear on whether the authors model the decision that 
there is at least one cash flow forecast for a firm in a year or the analyst decision to supplement each earnings 
forecast with a cash flow estimate, which is similar to the setting of this study. However, to ensure that differences 
in research designs do not affect the study’s inferences, in unreported results, we use model (4), without analyst 
characteristics, to examine the likelihood that there is at least one cash flow estimate issued with the earnings 
forecast for a firm in a fiscal year. The sample for this analysis reduces to 13,241 firm-year observations. We find 
that the likelihood of at least one cash flow estimate for a firm in a fiscal year decreases for firms with low earnings 
quality, which corroborates our earlier findings.  
32 Consider a ship building firm that receives a standard contract to build a vessel where the construction of a vessel 
takes several accounting periods and the payment occurs on completion of the contract. If cash collection and ship 
completion rates are reasonably certain, large accruals do not indicate low accrual or earnings quality.  
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for DeFond and Hung’s (2003) prediction that analysts produce cash flow forecasts in response 
to higher investor demand for cash flow forecasts when earnings quality is low.  
 
8. THE RELATION BETWEEN EARNINGS QUALITY AND THE ACCURACY OF 
ACCRUAL AND CASH FLOW FORECASTS 
Table 9 presents results of our accuracy regressions (5) and (6), which examine if the precision of 
accrual estimates and of cash flow forecasts reduces when earnings quality is low. Consistent 
with our prediction, low earnings quality reduces the accuracy of accrual estimates and of cash 
flow forecasts. Further, higher EPS forecast error has a negative effect on the cash flow forecast 
precision, consistent with analysts factoring earnings estimates into their cash flow forecasts.  
 Looking at the control variables, we find that higher cash flow volatility reduces the 
accuracy of analyst cash flow forecasts. The accrual and the cash flow forecast errors increase for 
smaller and high B/M stocks. This evidence is consistent with analysts facing a more challenging 
task forecasting cash flows for more risky stocks.33 Accrual and cash flow estimates are more 
precise for distressed stocks, which likely reflects that analysts devote more effort to produce 
accurate cash flow forecasts when these forecasts are valuable to investors in assessing firm 
liquidity and solvency. Similarly, we find that accrual estimates are more precise for loss making 
stocks. Finally, analysts produced more accurate cash flow estimates during the recent financial 
crisis. This likely reflects that cash flow forecasts were particularly valuable to investors in 
assessing firm liquidity and solvency during the recent financial crisis, which encouraged analysts 
to devote more effort to produce accurate cash flow estimates. Table 9 results are consistent 
with the notion that when earnings quality is low, analysts find forecasting accruals and cash 
flows more challenging. This evidence helps explain the negative association between low 
earnings quality and analyst propensity to report cash flow estimates. 
                                                          
33 Chan and Chen (1991), Fama and French (1992, 1993) and Vassalou and Xing (2004) explain that stocks with 
high book-to-market ratios are financially distressed and have high default risk. These stocks have higher earnings 
volatility making accruals more difficult to forecast.  
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9. THE PRICE REACTION TO ANALYST CASH FLOW FORECAST 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Since cash flow forecasts are issued when accruals are relatively easy to predict, investors may 
find cash flow forecasts of little use in assessing the quality of firm earnings and in valuation. To 
test this prediction, we examine the price reaction to cash flow forecast announcements.  
To measure the price reaction to analyst cash flow forecast revisions (ΔCF), controlling 
for earnings forecast revisions (ΔEPS), we calculate a three-day cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) centered on the EPS forecast announcement date. We use the CRSP value-weighted 
index as the benchmark to measure abnormal returns. We expect the coefficient on ΔCF to be 
insignificant if investors do not find cash flow forecasts incrementally informative. Further, we 
include revisions in revenue forecasts (ΔREV) as Keung (2010), Ertimur et al. (2011) and 
Bilinski and Eames (2012) find a significant incremental price reaction to revenue forecast 
revisions, controlling for contemporaneous EPS forecast revisions. We also control for the effect 
of revisions in stock recommendations on stock prices. We include two indicator variables for 
the direction of the recommendation revision. Upgrade (Downgrade) is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the analyst revises the stock recommendation upwards (downwards) to a more 
(less) favorable level, and zero otherwise.34 The resulting regression model is: 
0 1 2 3
4 5
ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
CAR CF EPS REV
Upgrade Downgrade
                            (9) 
where the intercept term captures stock recommendation reiterations. Regression standard errors 
are dual-clustered on firm and announcement date. 
                                                          
34 We require that the forecasts used to calculate revisions in earnings, cash flows and stock recommendations are 
no more than 300 days apart. This criterion eliminates infrequently revised forecasts. Further, we require that the 
revisions in earnings, cash flow and revenue estimates are for the same fiscal year. This ensures forecast revisions 
reflect only new information for a fiscal year. The additional selection criteria reduce the sample size to 341,861 
observations. Similarly to Call et al. (2013a), Keung (2010) and Bilinski and Eames (2012) we assume that cash flow 
and revenue forecast revisions are zero if the revised earnings forecast is not accompanied by a cash flow or a 
revenue forecast. As in Brav and Lehavy (2003), we assume an analyst reiterates the stock recommendation if the 
revised EPS forecast is not accompanied by a stock recommendation.  
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 Panel A of Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics for model (9). The mean abnormal 
price reaction is negative −0.16%, which reflects negative mean earnings and revenue forecast 
revisions of −3.95% and −0.13% respectively. The negative average price reaction and revisions 
in earnings and revenue forecasts are largely due to the inclusion of the recent financial crisis in 
the sample period. Mean cash flow forecast revision is positive 0.11%, and the proportion of 
stock recommendation upgrades and downgrades in the sample is 8.42% and 8.80%, 
respectively. 
The “Call et al. (2013) regression” columns in Panel B report regressions results for model 
(9) when we include only revisions in analyst cash flow and earnings estimates. This specification 
corresponds to the model examined in Call et al. (2013a). Consistent with the evidence in Call et 
al. (2013a), we find an incremental price reaction to cash flow forecast revisions, which suggests 
that cash flow forecasts contain valuable information that is incremental to earnings. However, 
this result does not persist when we control for revisions in revenue forecasts and stock 
recommendations. Specifically, columns “Controlling for revenue forecasts” show model (9) regression 
results when we include revisions in earnings and cash flow estimates together with the 
concurrent revisions in revenue estimates. Consistent with previous studies, we find a significant 
positive coefficient on revenue forecast revisions (Keung, 2010; Ertimur et al., 2011; and Bilinski 
and Eames, 2012). Controlling for revenue and earnings forecast revisions, we find no evidence 
that cash flow estimates have any information content.  
Columns “Controlling for stock recommendations” show results for the full specification of 
model (9). In line with previous studies, stock recommendation upgrades (downgrades) elicit a 
significant positive (negative) stock market reaction (Mikhail et al., 2004; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 
2004) compared to stock reiterations. Controlling for changes in stock recommendations, the 
coefficient on cash flow forecast revisions remains indistinguishable from zero. Finally, columns 
“Interaction terms” of Table 10 show results for model (9) after including an interaction term 
between revisions in analyst earnings and in cash flow forecasts, ∆EPS*∆CF. If analyst cash flow 
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forecasts aid investors in interpreting earnings estimates, the coefficient on the interaction term 
should be positive and significant.35 The results show that the coefficient on the interaction term 
is indistinguishable from zero, which suggests that investors do not use cash flow estimates to 
interpret earnings forecast revisions.36 Together, Table 10 results confirm that cash flow 
forecasts are of limited use to investors in assessing the quality of firm earnings and in 
valuation.37  
 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the recent trend of analysts issuing cash flow forecasts to complement their 
earnings estimates. We find that analysts are less likely to report cash flow forecasts with their 
earnings estimates when earnings quality is low. Further, we document that the accuracy of 
analyst cash flow estimates reduces when earnings quality is low. As the relative precision of cash 
flow forecasts decreases compared to earnings estimates, the usefulness of cash flow forecasts to 
investors reduces. Cash flow estimates that are not useful to investors are unlikely to be supplied 
by analysts, which explains low propensity of analysts to produce cash flow estimates when 
earnings quality is low.  
                                                          
35 Intuitively, if cash flow forecasts aid investors in interpreting EPS estimates, a 1% revision in an EPS forecast 
accompanied by a smaller percentage revision in the cash flow estimate may signal that higher earnings are due to 
accrual manipulations. 
36 In unreported results we also perform two tests to examine if our conclusion that analysts do not report cash flow 
forecasts when earnings quality is low is not driven by analysts privately conveying their forecasts to “key” clients. 
Specifically, we examine if cash flow forecast revisions associate with abnormal returns measured in a three day 
window ending two days before the public disclosure of the report, CAR(−5, −3). If analysts privately convey their 
forecasts to key clients, the revisions in analyst cash flows later announced to the public should correlate with 
CARs(−5, −3). We look at the window (−5, −3) because a long gap between the private and the public report 
disclosure is likely to erode the trading benefit of the privately disclosed cash flow forecast as new information 
arrives to the market and other investors may acquire the private information. Our second test examines the 
distribution of public cash flow forecast announcements over the week. Privately disclosed forecasts should 
concentrate early in the week to facilitate share trading by “key” investors. Private disclosures late in the week are 
less likely due to higher uncertainty new information may be revealed over the weekend. We find that cash flow 
forecasts revisions do not correlate with CARs(−5, −3) and that joint issues of cash flow and earnings forecasts are 
uniformly distributed across the week. Together, these results suggest that analysts are unlikely to privately target 
particular investors with their cash flow estimates. 
37 In unreported results we perform two additional tests. First, we find that our conclusions from Table 10 remain 
unchanged when we repeat model (9) and measure price reaction in a 5-day window around the earnings forecast 
announcement. Second, we repeat model (9), after including the interaction term ∆EPS*∆CF, for a sample of firms 
with at least one cash flow forecast issued for a firm in a fiscal year. This setting allows us to test more directly if 
cash flow forecasts aid investors in interpreting earnings forecasts. We find that the coefficient on the interaction 
term remains indistinguishable from zero for this subsample.  
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Figure 1 
The frequency of joint cash flow and earnings forecasts across earnings quality deciles 
 
Notes: 
The figure presents the frequency of joint cash flow forecasts (CF) and earnings forecasts (EPS) issuance across 
deciles formed on the variation in discretionary current accruals. Portfolio Low Earn. Q includes stocks with the 
highest variation in discretionary current accruals. Portfolio High Earn. Q includes stocks with the lowest variation in 
discretionary current accruals. Discretionary accruals are estimated from the McNichols (2002) model.  
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Table 1 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: The dependent variables 
DCF 
Cash flow forecast dummy, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the analyst 
reported the cash flow forecast with the earnings estimate, and zero otherwise.  
|Accrual_FE| 
The accrual forecast error calculated as the difference between errors in the analyst’s cash 
flow and earnings forecasts.  
|CF_FE| 
The cash flow forecast error, which is the absolute difference between the actual and analyst 
forecasted cash flows scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Panel B: The independent variables: earnings quality measures 
M_CAQ 
Earnings quality measure, which is the standard deviation of discretionary current accruals 
estimated from McNichols’s (2002) current accruals model for the previous four fiscal years. 
C_ACC_STD 
Current accruals volatility, which is the standard deviation of current accruals for the 
previous four fiscal years. Current accruals are defined as the change in current assets, less 
change in cash, less change in current liabilities plus the change in debt in current liabilities. 
We scale current accruals by average total assets for the current and the previous fiscal year. 
C_ACC Signed current accruals for the previous fiscal year. 
J_CAQ 
Variation in discretionary total accruals form the Jones model (Jones 1991) estimated for the 
previous four fiscal years.  
MD_ACC 
The signed magnitude of discretionary current accruals, which is measured by the residual 
from the McNichols’ (2002) accruals model for the firm for the previous fiscal year. 
nMD_ACC 
The signed magnitude of non-discretionary current accruals, which is measured by the 
predicted value from the McNichols’ (2002) current accruals model for the firm for the 
previous fiscal year. 
|T_ACC| 
Absolute total accruals. Total accruals are defined as the change in current assets, less 
change in cash, less change in current liabilities plus the change in debt in current liabilities 
less depreciation and amortization expense. We scale total accruals by average total assets 
for the current and the previous fiscal year. 
T_ACC Signed absolute total accruals.  
Panel C: The independent variables: forecast and analyst characteristics 
|EPS_FE| 
The earnings-per-share forecast error, computed as the absolute difference between the 
actual and forecasted earnings scaled by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Star analyst 
Analyst star ranking, which is an indicator variable that equals one for analysts classified as 
members of the All-America Research Team by the Institutional Investor magazine in the 
most recent annual ranking. 
G_Experience 
Analyst forecasting experience, computed as the number of years an analyst has issued at 
least one earnings forecast. 
Broker size 
Broker size, measured by the number of analysts employed by the broker who issued at least 
one earnings forecast in the previous 12 months. 
Analyst workload 
Analyst workload, which is the number of companies for which an analyst issued at least one 
earnings forecast over the previous 12 months. 
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Table 1, continued 
 
Panel D: The independent variables: firm characteristics 
CF_STD 
Cash flow volatility, which is the ratio of the cash flows standard deviation scaled by the 
mean cash flow level measured over the previous four fiscal years. 
MV 
Firm size, computed as the firm’s market capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year 
in $ millions. 
Analyst following 
Intensity of analyst coverage, which is calculated as the number of analysts issuing at least 
one earnings forecast for the firm over the previous 12 months. 
B/M 
Book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of total common equity over the firm’s market 
capitalization at the end of the previous fiscal year 
Age 
Firm age, which is the number of years between the firm’s first appearance on CRSP files 
and the end-date of the previous fiscal year. 
Dloss 
A loss dummy, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm's I/B/E/S reported 
actual earnings are negative, and zero otherwise. 
Altman Z 
Altman’s Z-score, which equals 1.2(Net working capital/Total Assets)+1.4(Retained 
earnings/Total Assets)+3.3(EBIT/Total Assets)+0.6(Equity market value/Book value of 
liabilities)+1.0(Sales/Total Assets).  
Fin_crisis 
A financial crisis dummy, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the EPS forecast 
has been issued after September 2007, and zero otherwise. September 2007 is the month in 
which Swiss Bank UBS announced a third quarter pre-tax loss of $690 million and a $3.42 
billion write-down of mortgage backed securities. Announcements of losses on mortgage 
backed securities by other large international banks followed shortly, leading to the 
subprime crisis. 
Industry dummies 11 industry dummies based on the sector code from the I/B/E/S SIG code. 
Year dummies Year dummies based on the calendar year of the earnings forecast issue. 
Notes: 
The table provides the definitions of the variables used in the study. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of earnings and cash flow forecasts over the sample period and across industries 
 
  Total # # EPS (%) # CF&EPS        (%) 
Panel A: Distribution of EPS and CF forecasts across fiscal years 
2000 43984 42381 96.4% 1603 3.6% 
2001 47446 44873 94.6% 2573 5.4% 
2002 50552 47751 94.5% 2801 5.5% 
2003 58105 52462 90.3% 5643 9.7% 
2004 65752 59875 91.1% 5877 8.9% 
2005 67658 60066 88.8% 7592 11.2% 
2006 68464 64297 93.9% 4167 6.1% 
2007 67118 59417 88.5% 7701 11.5% 
2008 68687 56824 82.7% 11863 17.3% 
Total 537766 487946 90.7% 49820 9.3% 
Panel B: Industry distribution   
 
Total # # EPS (%) # CF&EPS (%) 
% of analysts 
issuing CF 
Finance 1100 1069 97.2% 31 2.8% 15.8% 
Health 66060 63895 96.7% 2165 3.3% 8.4% 
Consumer non-durables 27945 26359 94.3% 1586 5.7% 11.6% 
Consumer services 106484 102849 96.6% 3635 3.4% 9.4% 
Consumer durables 17351 16766 96.6% 585 3.4% 12.0% 
Energy 75206 44244 58.8% 30962 41.2% 51.5% 
Transportation 14188 13547 95.5% 641 4.5% 10.2% 
Technology 136183 131823 96.8% 4360 3.2% 8.4% 
Basic industries 32415 29892 92.2% 2523 7.8% 18.5% 
Capital goods 36429 34724 95.3% 1705 4.7% 12.0% 
Public utilities 24405 22778 93.3% 1627 6.7% 12.3% 
Notes:  
Panel A reports the total number of earnings forecasts (Total #), the number of stand-alone EPS forecasts (# EPS) 
and the number of EPS forecasts complemented by cash flow  forecasts(#CF&EPS ) across fiscal years 2000–2008. 
(%) reports corresponding percentages. Row Total reports the number of unique observations in each category. 
Panel B presents the distribution of stand-alone EPS forecasts and of EPS forecasts complemented by cash flow 
forecasts across 11 industry groups based on the 2-digit I/B/E/S SIG code. Column % of analysts issuing CF reports 
the percentage of analysts issuing at least one cash flow forecast for a firm in a year.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable N Mean Median STD p 
Panel A: The independent variables        
DCF 537766 9.26% 0.00% 28.99% 0.000 
|Accruals_FE| 49820 1.32% 0.57% 3.36% 0.000 
|CF_FE| 49820 2.59% 1.33% 3.76% 0.000 
Panel B: EPS forecast errors and the earnings quality proxy 
  
|EPS_FE| 537766 1.33% 0.38% 3.00% 0.000 
|EPS_FE| | CF 49820 1.26% 0.50% 2.43% 0.000 
M_CAQ 13241 8.12% 5.27% 8.11% 0.000 
Panel C: Analyst- and broker-related variables 
  
Star analyst 
537766 
0.40% 0.00% 6.31% 0.000 
G_experience 6.383 6.000 3.268 0.000 
Broker size 56.079 48.000 41.355 0.000 
Analyst workload 13.631 13.000 6.558 0.000 
Panel D: Firm-related variables   
   
CF_STD 
13241 
1.222 0.453 3.205 0.000 
MV 3865.560 696.480 9807.990 0.000 
Analyst following 10.495 8.000 8.927 0.000 
B/M 0.497 0.421 0.395 0.000 
Age 20.994 14.334 17.045 0.000 
Dloss 17.93% 0.00% 38.36% 0.000 
Altman Z 5.041 3.466 5.935 0.000 
Fin_crisis 11.31% 0.00% 31.68% 0.000 
Notes:  
The table reports the number of unique observations (N), and mean (Mean) and median (Median) values of the 
dependent and explanatory variables used in the study, together with their standard deviations (STD) and p-values 
(p). Panel A presents the results for the dependent variables. Panel B reports the forecast error of all earnings 
forecasts in the sample (|EPS_FE|) and of earnings forecasts issued with cash flow estimates (|EPS_FE| | CF), 
and the earnings quality proxy. Panel C shows the results for analyst- and broker-related explanatory variables. Panel 
D describes the results for firm-related explanatory variables. Other variable definitions are in Table 1.  
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Table 4 
Predicting the analyst decision to disclose a cash flow forecast with the earnings estimate 
 
  Predicted sign   Estimate ME p 
Intercept 
  
-4.757 
 
0.000 
M_CAQ Demand (+)/Supply (−) −2.631 −19.3% 0.000 
Star analyst Supply (+) 0.617 3.9% 0.039 
G_experience Supply (+) −0.011 −3.5% 0.536 
ln Broker size Supply (+) 0.167 17.7% 0.010 
Analyst workload Supply (−) −0.001 −0.5% 0.933 
CF_STD Demand (+)/Supply (−) −0.029 −7.0% 0.067 
ln MV Demand (−)/Supply (+) 0.070 11.6% 0.311 
ln Analyst following Demand (−)/Supply (+) 0.472 32.8% 0.000 
B/M Demand (−) −0.294 −9.2% 0.047 
ln Age Demand (−)/Supply (+) −0.175 −13.2% 0.002 
Dloss Demand (+) −0.249 −7.9% 0.031 
Altman Z Demand (−) −0.045 −26.5% 0.000 
Fin_crisis Demand (+) 0.149 5.5% 0.204 
Industry effect 
  
Yes 
  
Year effect 
  
Yes 
  
N 
  
537766 
  
Wald 2 
  
2733.34 
  
p(2) 
  
0.000 
  
R2     28.07%     
Notes:  
The table presents regression results (Estimate) from a logistic model predicting the likelihood an analyst will issue a 
cash flow forecast to complement the earnings estimate. Variable definitions are in Table 1. Column Predicted sign 
describes the predicted sign of the coefficient. ME are the marginal effects, ln is the logarithm, and p are p-values for 
regression coefficients based on analyst- and year-clustered standard errors. N is the number of observations, Wald 2 is the Wald 2-test for model specification and p(2) the corresponding p-value. R2 is the pseudo R-squared. 
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Table 5 
Sensitivity tests 
 
  Current accruals volatility Jones model Magnitude of current accruals Management guidance Other DH (2003) controls 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept −4.593 0.001 −4.654 0.001 −5.004 0.000 −4.753 0.000 −6.121 0.000 
C_ACC_STD −4.151 0.000 
        
J_CAQ 
  
−3.340 0.000 
      
MD_ACC 
    
−0.648 0.009 
    
nMD_ACC 
    
−2.650 0.014 
    
M_CAQ 
      
−2.610 0.000 −1.830 0.000 
Guidance 
      
0.118 0.057 0.176 0.008 
Acc_Het_Ind 
        
0.004 0.977 
EPS_STD 
        
0.004 0.372 
Capital intensity 
        
0.296 0.000 
Star analyst 0.621 0.039 0.617 0.039 0.616 0.041 0.620 0.038 0.680 0.020 
G_experience −0.011 0.527 −0.011 0.522 −0.011 0.547 −0.011 0.528 −0.007 0.676 
ln Broker size 0.166 0.011 0.166 0.011 0.167 0.011 0.166 0.011 0.180 0.004 
Analyst workload −0.001 0.906 −0.001 0.929 −0.001 0.944 −0.001 0.928 −0.007 0.445 
CF_STD −0.019 0.229 −0.024 0.116 −0.036 0.039 −0.028 0.067 −0.010 0.443 
ln MV 0.055 0.427 0.064 0.357 0.098 0.133 0.069 0.319 0.161 0.038 
ln Analyst following 0.487 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.429 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.260 0.001 
B/M −0.324 0.040 −0.306 0.043 −0.224 0.107 −0.291 0.047 −0.198 0.195 
ln Age −0.182 0.001 −0.184 0.001 −0.172 0.002 −0.174 0.002 −0.077 0.141 
Dloss −0.189 0.084 −0.226 0.052 −0.386 0.001 −0.244 0.035 −0.417 0.001 
Altman Z −0.039 0.000 −0.043 0.000 −0.045 0.000 −0.044 0.000 −0.017 0.023 
Fin_crisis 0.150 0.205 0.150 0.204 0.146 0.204 0.150 0.201 0.147 0.232 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 537766 
 
537766 
 
537766 
 
537766 
 
537766 
 
Wald 2 2754.78 
 
2758.62 
 
2756.46 
 
2881.94 
 
3093.90 
 
p(2) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 28.26%   28.15%   28.02%   28.08%   29.61%   
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Notes:  
The table presents results from logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a cash flow forecast to complement the earnings estimate. Columns Current accruals volatility 
report regression results when we use the volatility of current accruals, C_ACC_STD, to measure earnings quality. Columns Jones model show regression results when we use the 
variation in discretionary total accruals from the Jones model (Jones 1991), J_CAQ, to measure earnings quality. Columns Magnitude of current accruals present results when we use the 
signed level of discretionary and non-discretionary current accruals from the McNichols (2002) accruals model, MD_ACC and nMD_ACC, to measure earnings quality. Columns 
Management guidance report results for regression model (4) when we include an indicator variable for firm earnings guidance, Guidance. Columns Other DH (2003) controls show 
regression results when we include in model (4) three controls from DeFond and Hung (2003) in addition to Guidance. Acc_Het_Ind is the accounting choice heterogeneity index that 
captures the comparability of a firm’s accounting choices with that of industry’s peers. EPS_STD is the earnings volatility for the previous four fiscal years. Capital intensity is the 
capital intensity, which is measured as the ratio of gross property, plant and equipment divided by sales revenue. Other variables definitions are in Table 1. ln is the logarithm, p are 
p-values for regression coefficients based on analyst- and year-clustered standard errors. N is the number of observations, Wald 2is the Wald 2-test for model specification and 
p(2) the corresponding p-value. R2 is the pseudo R-squared. 
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Table 6 
Annual and Fama-MacBeth regressions 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Fama-MacBeth 
 
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Intercept −5.090 −3.548 −3.663 −6.475 −7.799 −5.741 −5.799 −2.777 −1.415 −4.701 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.000 
M_CAQ −2.995 −11.166 −2.832 −1.697 −0.733 −2.494 −2.127 −3.914 −2.680 −3.404 
p 0.033 0.000 0.049 0.039 0.465 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.010 
Star analyst 0.715 0.731 1.209 0.717 0.317 0.325 0.210 0.111 1.009 0.594 
p 0.077 0.345 0.138 0.046 0.481 0.382 0.722 0.872 0.153 0.002 
G_experience −0.062 −0.053 0.017 0.012 0.024 0.016 −0.010 −0.017 −0.034 −0.012 
p 0.349 0.344 0.671 0.665 0.395 0.588 0.717 0.481 0.115 0.298 
ln Broker size 0.474 −0.112 0.085 0.339 0.174 0.184 −0.064 0.102 0.264 0.161 
p 0.002 0.253 0.392 0.000 0.040 0.045 0.432 0.190 0.000 0.032 
Analyst workload 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.006 −0.005 −0.021 0.001 
p 0.626 0.786 0.618 0.746 0.996 0.610 0.667 0.715 0.103 0.680 
CF_STD −0.206 −0.058 −0.009 −0.009 0.012 −0.032 −0.045 −0.012 −0.065 −0.047 
p 0.219 0.187 0.708 0.731 0.506 0.323 0.059 0.530 0.039 0.061 
ln MV 0.142 0.166 −0.281 0.045 0.438 0.216 −0.110 0.001 −0.008 0.068 
p 0.086 0.037 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.989 0.843 0.353 
ln Analyst following 0.264 −0.120 1.030 0.618 0.435 0.391 0.946 0.716 0.270 0.506 
p 0.169 0.441 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.003 
B/M −0.019 −0.162 −0.529 0.026 −0.191 −0.502 −1.591 −0.602 −0.256 −0.425 
p 0.937 0.467 0.031 0.829 0.422 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.032 
ln Age −0.503 −0.545 −0.125 0.035 −0.183 −0.111 −0.129 −0.286 −0.198 −0.227 
p 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.534 0.011 0.091 0.087 0.000 0.001 0.007 
Dloss −0.316 1.133 −1.121 −0.160 −1.284 −0.709 −0.018 −0.162 −0.072 −0.301 
p 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.001 0.949 0.275 0.516 0.239 
Altman Z −0.082 −0.072 −0.124 −0.039 −0.049 −0.036 −0.029 −0.034 −0.037 −0.056 
p 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.004 0.006 0.058 0.011 0.001 0.001 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 43984 47446 50552 58105 65752 67658 68464 67118 68687 
 
Wald 2 187.09 848.73 435.12 442.50 461.44 560.07 773.34 482.66 280.120 
 
p(2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
R2 18.13% 45.70% 32.62% 20.74% 25.93% 31.68% 41.54% 29.72% 20.67% 
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Notes:  
The table reports results from annual and Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting that an analyst will issue a cash flow forecast to complement the earnings estimate. Columns 2000–
2008 report results for fiscal-year logistic regressions predicting that an analyst will complement the earnings estimate with a cash flow forecast. Columns Fama-MacBeth present 
results from the Fama-MacBeth analysis. Variables definitions are in Table 1. ln is the logarithm. For annual regressions, p are p-values based on analyst-clustered standard errors. 
For Fama-MacBeth regression, p are p-values corrected for time-series dependence. N is the number of observations, Wald 2 is the Wald 2-test for model specification and p(2) 
the corresponding p-value. R2 is the pseudo R-squared. 
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Table 7 
Durations between cash flow forecast revisions 
 
  Estimate Hazard ratio p 
M_CAQ −0.455 0.634 0.000 
Star analyst 0.285 1.329 0.000 
G_experience −0.009 0.991 0.000 
ln Broker size −0.008 0.992 0.076 
Analyst workload 0.007 1.007 0.000 
CF_STD −0.004 0.996 0.351 
ln MV −0.044 0.956 0.000 
ln Analyst following 0.114 1.121 0.000 
B/M 0.020 1.020 0.337 
ln Age −0.019 0.981 0.011 
Dloss −0.019 0.981 0.400 
Altman Z −0.012 0.988 0.000 
Fin_crisis 0.468 1.597 0.000 
Industry effect Yes 
  
Year effect Yes 
  
N 49810 
  
Wald 2 26985.85 
 
 
p(2) 0.000     
Notes: 
The table presents results (Estimate) from the non-parametric proportional Cox model (Cox, 1972) that examines the 
durations between cash flow forecast revisions. Hazard ratio shows the hazard ratio. Variable definitions are in Table 
1. ln is the logarithm, p are p-values and N is the number of observations, Wald 2 is the Wald 2-test for model 
specification and p(2) the corresponding p-value.   
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Table 8 
Analysis of the results in DeFond and Hung (2003) 
 
 
Absolute total accruals, DH (2003) Signed total accruals Variation in total accruals Signed current accruals 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept −5.251 0.000 −5.269 0.000 −4.633 0.001 −5.025 0.000 
|T_ACC| 1.352 0.000 
    
  T_ACC 
  
−2.314 0.000 
  
  T_ACC_STD 
    
−3.554 0.000 
  C_ACC 
      
−0.892 0.000 
Star analyst 0.618 0.039 0.617 0.041 0.617 0.039 0.615 0.040 
G_experience −0.010 0.567 −0.010 0.580 −0.011 0.522 −0.011 0.548 
ln Broker size 0.168 0.010 0.167 0.010 0.166 0.011 0.167 0.011 
Analyst workload −0.001 0.943 −0.001 0.892 −0.001 0.927 0.000 0.961 
CF_STD −0.044 0.010 −0.033 0.043 −0.021 0.173 −0.039 0.020 
ln MV 0.111 0.095 0.114 0.085 0.060 0.385 0.097 0.142 
ln Analyst following 0.418 0.000 0.404 0.000 0.480 0.000 0.435 0.000 
B/M −0.174 0.185 −0.175 0.200 −0.309 0.042 −0.221 0.108 
ln Age −0.160 0.003 −0.167 0.002 −0.184 0.001 −0.171 0.002 
Dloss −0.393 0.001 −0.383 0.001 −0.212 0.067 −0.361 0.002 
Altman Z −0.049 0.000 −0.039 0.000 −0.042 0.000 −0.046 0.000 
Fin_crisis 0.152 0.185 0.150 0.186 0.150 0.203 0.149 0.191 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 537766 
 
537766 
 
537766 
 
537766 
 
Wald 2 2771.69 
 
2776.85 
 
2767.38 
 
2743.13 
 
p(2) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 28.01%   28.25%   28.19%   27.98%   
Notes:  
The table presents results (Estimate) from logistic regressions predicting the likelihood an analyst will issue a cash flow estimate to complement the earnings forecast. Columns 
Absolute total accruals, DH (2003) report results from model (4) when we use absolute total accruals, |T_ACC|, as the earnings quality measure. Columns Signed total accruals show 
results for model (4) when we use signed total accruals, T_ACC, as the earnings quality measure. Columns Variation in total accruals present results for model (4) when we use the 
variation in total accruals, T_ACC_STD, as the earnings quality measure. Columns Signed current accruals show results for model (4) when we use signed current accruals, C_ACC, as 
the earnings quality measure. Other variables definitions are in Table 1. ln is the logarithm and p are p-values for regression coefficients based on analyst- and year-clustered 
standard errors. N is the number of observations, Wald 2is the Wald 2-test for model specification and p(2) the corresponding p-value. R2 is the pseudo R-square.  
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Table 9 
Regression results for the accuracy of accruals and cash flow estimates 
 
 
Accrual forecast error CF forecast error 
  Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.021 0.000 0.028 0.000 
M_CAQ 0.049 0.000 0.042 0.001 
|EPS_FE| 
  
0.642 0.000 
Star analyst 0.003 0.291 0.003 0.309 
G_experience 0.000 0.675 0.000 0.882 
ln Broker size 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.477 
Analyst workload 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.512 
CF_STD 0.001 0.130 0.001 0.077 
ln MV −0.001 0.002 −0.002 0.000 
ln Analyst following 0.000 0.696 0.000 0.591 
B/M 0.014 0.000 0.019 0.000 
ln Age 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.605 
Dloss −0.018 0.000 −0.002 0.423 
Altman Z −0.001 0.000 −0.001 0.000 
Fin_crisis 0.000 0.558 −0.002 0.014 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 49820 
 
49820 
 
F-test  86.980 
 
190.830 
 
p(F) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 7.17%   29.66%   
Notes:  
The table presents regression results (Estimate) from the accuracy models where the dependent variable is the accrual 
forecast error (Accrual forecast error) or the cash flow forecast error (CF forecast error). Variable definitions are in Table 1. ln 
is the logarithm and p are p-values for regression coefficients based on analyst- and year-clustered standard errors. N is 
the number of observations, F-test is the F-test for the model specification and p(F) the corresponding p-value. R2 is the 
R-squared. 
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Table 10 
Price reaction regressions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the variables in the price reaction model (N= 341,861) 
 
Mean Median STD p 
CAR(−1,1) −0.16% 0.01% 7.53% 0.000 
∆EPS −3.95% −0.26% 31.30% 0.000 
∆CF 0.11% 0.00% 3.63% 0.000 
∆REV −0.13% 0.00% 3.93% 0.000 
Upgrade 8.42% 0.00% 27.77% 0.000 
Downgrade 8.80% 0.00% 28.32% 0.000 
Panel B: Price reaction model regression results 
 
Call et al. (2013) 
regression 
Controlling for revenue 
forecast 
Controlling for stock 
recommendations 
Interaction terms 
 
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p 
Intercept 0.000 0.483 0.000 0.404 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
∆EPS 0.049 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.039 0.000 
∆CF 0.019 0.002 0.010 0.102 0.008 0.212 0.008 0.210 
∆REV 
  
0.217 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.195 0.000 
Upgrade 
    
0.032 0.000 0.032 0.000 
Downgrade 
    
−0.045 0.000 −0.045 0.000 
∆EPS*∆CF 
      
−0.003 0.826 
N 341861 
 
341861 
 
341861 
 
341861 
 
F-test 771.54 
 
630.38 
 
698.05 
 
592.09 
 
p(F) 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 4.17%   5.38%   9.95% 
 
9.95% 
 
Notes:  
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the variables in model (9), which examines the price reaction to analyst cash 
flow forecast revisions (∆CF). CAR (−1,1) is the three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the earnings 
forecast announcement date. ∆EPS is the analyst’s EPS forecast revision and ∆REV is the analyst’s revenue forecast 
revision. Upgrade is the stock recommendation upgrade and Downgrade is the stock recommendation downgrade. 
Panel B presents the regression results for model (9). Columns Call et al. (2013) regression show the regression results 
for model (9) when we include only revisions in analyst earnings and cash flow forecasts as in Call et al. (2013a). 
Columns Controlling for revenue forecast show the regression results for model (9) when we include revisions in earnings 
and in cash flow estimates together with the concurrent revisions in revenue estimates. Columns Controlling for stock 
recommendations report results for the full specification of model (9). Columns Interaction terms show results when we 
repeat model (9) after including an interaction term between revisions in analyst earnings and in cash flow forecasts, 
∆EPS*∆CF. p are p-values for regression coefficients based on firm- and date-clustered standard errors, N is the 
number of observations, F-test is the F-test for model specification and p(F) is the corresponding p-value. R2 is the R-
squared.    
  
